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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1948-19119

The much litigated case of Roth v. Kaptowsky 13 has finally
resulted in a determination that Section 19 of the Garnishment
Act 1 4 is broad enough to permit a court to enter a judgment in
favor of a creditor against a garnishee under which monthly installments payable out of the proceeds of a life insurance
option settlement may be appropriated, as the same mature,
toward the payment of a judgment against the life inAs a result of that decision, one
surance beneficiary.
said to be completely novel in the law of this state, new suits
to reach the successive monthly payments as they become due are
rendered unnecessary. The case affords a striking parallel to the
doctrine of Levinson v. Home Bank & Trust Company 5 wherein
the garnishee was permitted, under Section 13 of the Garnishment
Act,' 6 to set off all demands against the debtor whether the same
were due at the time of garnishment or not. Logical extension of
the instant case could carry the creditor's right over so as to
reach the proceeds of other installment contracts.
One slight change has been made to the Attachment Act by
the addition thereto of a section setting forth a preferred form
of affidavit for attachment. 7 The section is permissive in character.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
There has been a scarcity of cases of any serious import in
the field of substantive criminal law since the last issue of this
survey, but a few new points have been made. In People v.
Wheeler,' for example, the indictment contained two counts,
one charging a fraudulent and felonious embezzlement and conversion of certain personal property which had been loaned to
defendant, the other charging embezzlement of property which
13401 Ill. 424, 82 N. E. (2d) 661 (1948), affirming 333 Ill. App. 112, 76 N. E.
(2d) 786 (1948). See companion aspects of the case in 326 Ill. App. 415, 62 N. E.
(2d) 17 (1945), reversed in 393 Ill. 484, 66 N. E. (2d) 664 (1946).
14

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 62, § 19.

15337 Ill. 241, 169 N. E. 193 (1929).
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 62, § 13.
17 Laws 1949, p. 322, H. B. 216; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, § 2a.
'403 Ill. 78, 84 N. E. (2d) 832 (1949).
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had been entrusted to defendant as bailee. A general finding and
sentence of guilty of the crime of larceny was appealed from on
the theory that the judgment was erronous because based on a
finding of larceny whereas the indictment charged embezzlement,
or else because the indictment forced the defendant to meet
charges of three separate crimes, to-wit: embezzlement, larceny by
bailee, and grand larceny. The conviction was affirmed when the
Supreme Court pointed out that the Illinois statute defining the
offense of larceny by bailee declares that one who commits such
an offense shall be deemed guilty of larceny. 2 A general finding
of guilty of larceny was, therefore, deemed proper provided the
evidence warranted a conviction.
. An ingenious but ineffectual defense was proposed
in People
3
v. Raddatz, wherein the defendant had been convicted on a count
charging the taking of indecent liberties with a seven-year old
girl tending to render her guilty of indecent and lascivious conduct. It was argued that, the victim being below the statutory
age at which a child could be found guilty of a crime or misdemeanor, 4 there was nothing the defendant could do which would
give rise to a chargeable offense against himself. Both the Appellate Court and the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on the
ground the statute 5 did not require that the child be or become delinquent before a conviction could be had.
The holding in City of Chicago v. Terminiello,6 noted in the
two prior issues of this survey, failed to stand up when the case
reached the United States Supreme Court. 7 The defendant had
been convicted of violating a city ordinance through the medium
of a speech which he had made leading to a breach of the peace.
The defendant had contended throughout that his constitutional
2 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 395.
3403 I1. 48, 85 N. E. (2d) 32 (1949), affirming 335 Ill. App. 575, 82 N. E. (2d)
508 (1948).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 591.
5 Ibid., Ch. 38, §§ 103-4.
6400 Il. 23, 79 N. E. (2d) 39 (1948), noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 4S,
affirming 332 Ill. App. 17, 74 N. E. (2d) 45 (1947), noted in 26 CMIOAGO-KENT LAW
REVrw 50.
7 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed. 1131 (1949).
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Frankfurter and Jackson wrote dissenting
opinions. Justice Burton concurred in the dissent.
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right to free speech had been denied to him. The highest court,
by a five-to-four vote, reversed because of an error in an instruction, 8 one which had not been excepted to at the trial and upon
which no error had been assigned either in the Illinois Appellate
or Supreme Court or in the petition for certiorari or brief filed
before the United States Supreme Court. The majority indicated
that the construction placed on the language of the ordinance by
the instruction was as binding as if the precise words had been
written into the ordinance itself. Conceiving that one function
of free speech was to "invite dispute," the majority decided that
free speech would best serve its high purpose when it did induce
a condition of unrest, did create dissatisfaction with conditions as
they were, or even when it stirred people to anger. The principal
criticism voiced by the dissenters was against the action of the
court in dealing with a point not raised or urged by the defendant.
Addition to substantive criminal law has been made by the
passage of two new statutes. One of them creates the offense of
"reckless homicide" so as to warrant the imposition of a penalty
upon any person who drives a vehicle with reckless disregard for
the safety of others and thereby causes death.9 The other makes
the crime of child abandonment into a felony by providing for a
sentence of from one to three years in the penitentiary. 10
No cases were reported during the survey period which
were of interest concerning such matters as arrest, preliminary
examination or grand jury proceedings, but two cases dealing
s The trial court had charged that a breach of the peace could consist of any
"misbehavior which violates the public peace and decorum" and that such misbehavior might "constitute a breach of the peace if it stirs the public to anger,
invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if
it molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm."
9 Laws 1949, p. 716, S. B. 185; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 364(a). The
penalty may be by fine up to $1000, by imprisonment in the county jail up to six
months, or both, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary from one to five years.
The requirement that death occur within a year and a day has been made applicable to this offense: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 365. As to the basis
for such a requirement, see Zacharias, "Homicide: Why Death in a Year and a
w 181.
Day?" in 19 CHICAGo-KENT LAW R
10 Laws 1949, p. 714, H. B. 156; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 99. A
change has also been made in the statute regulating change of venue in criminal
cases, where the cause assigned is the prejudice of the judge against the defendant
or his attorney, in that the accompanying affidavit need be made by either the
defendant or his attorney, instead of both as heretofore required: Laws 1949, p.
1630, H. B. 91; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 146, § 21.
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with the sufficiency of informations or indictments invoke interest. The information filed in People v. Ostrowski," signed and
sworn to by the complaining witness, was prepared on a standard
form issued by the court. The body thereof appropriately charged
the offense of contributing to the delinquency of a child but it
failed to state the name of the person bringing the prosecution or
that such person was a resident of the city. No motion was made
before trial to correct the document but, for that matter, the
defendant likewise failed to addres any criticism thereto. The
conviction was affirmed, and re-affirmed by the state Supreme
Court, on the ground that the information was sufficient as the
failure to name the complaining witness and to describe her as a
resident did not render the information invalid in the absence
of objection prior to trial.
Much the same treatment was accorded to the problem raised
in People v. Gray,12 where the indictment charged a felony, burglary, in one count and the misdemeanor of malicious mischief in
another. Having been found guilty on both counts and sentenced
to a term of from three to twenty years, defendant contended
on appeal that the judgment was void because the indictment
covered separate and distinct offenses carrying different penalties.
Any duplicity, the court said, went to the form of the indictment
and, in the absence of a motion to quash, was not open for consideration. The presence of language in the judgment indicating
a sentence for malicious mischief was treated as surplusage.
The right of an accused person to be represented by counsel
was involved in three very similar cases, 13 wherein sentence
had been entered on pleas of guilty. The defendants complained
that they had not been advised of their right to have the benefit
of counsel, but the court reiterated the previously existing rule
that a trial court had no affirmative duty to advise the defendants
of the right to counsel in non-capital cases. It should be noted,
11402 Ill. 106, 83 N. E. (2d) 276 (1948), affirming 334 Ii. App. 494, 80 N. E.
(2d) 89 (1948).
12402 Ill. 590, 85 N. E. (2d) 2 (1949).
13 People v. Barrigar, 401 Il1. 471, 82 N. E. (2d) 433 (1948) ; People v. Cox, 401
I1. 432, 82 N. E. (2d) 463 (1948) ; People v. Bennett, 401 Ill. 403, 82 N. E. (2d)
465 (1948).
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however, that the defendants had been indicted prior to the promulgation of present Rule 27A, which should clarify the issue
in this respect.' 4 In People v. Cohen,'5 by contrast, the trial judge
had, sua sponte, appointed the public defender to serve as counsel
for the defendant and, when he was permitted to withdraw, had
appointed still another counsel. After several continuances, the
defendant moved to substitute counsel of his own choice but his
motion was overruled. Reversal of the ensuing conviction was
sought because the motion had been denied. It was said that no
error had occurred in the action leading to the appointment of
counsel to defend, even in the absence of such a request, but that
such appointment could not operate to deprive the defendant of
his right to have counsel of his own choice when he elected to
assert that right.
The defendant's refusal to submit to the examination intended
by the "sexual psychopath" statute 1 6 led to defendant's imprisonment, in People v. Redlich,17 for contempt of court until
he complied with the order for examination. While the contempt
order remained in force, the defendant was tried under an indictment charging a crime against nature, was found guilty, and was
sentenced to the penitentiary. The Supreme Court declared that
his status as a sexual psychopath was made moot by the conviction but it reversed the contempt order. As the obvious purpose
of the statutory examination was to prevent a person who was
afflicted with a mental disorder from being tried for a criminal
offense until he had recovered from his psychopathic condition, the
whole object of the statute was said to be destroyed by the conviction. For that reason, proceedings under the statute designed
to secure a determination of mental condition, including all orders
entered in connection therewith, were rendered void by the determination that the defendant was sane and guilty.
A judicially permitted separation of the jury empanelled in
14 The rule is set out in 400 11. 22 and in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110,
It is now the mandatory duty of the trial judge to advise the defendant
as to his right to counsel.

§ 259.27A.

15402 Ill. 574, 85 N. E. (2d)

19 (1949).

16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 820 et seq.
17402 I1. 270, 83 N. E. (2d) 736 (1949).
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a non-capital case, where much publicity was given to the trial,
became the bone of contention in People v. Wilson,'8 The defendant had been accused of placing explosives in the automobile of
his divorced wife. He sought an order, before the jury had been
selected, designed to require that the jurors be kept together
during the trial, but his motion was denied. Prior to verdict, he
made another motion to declare a mistrial because of the unfavorable publicity received but failed to succeed and he was found
guilty. The Supreme Court, when reversing and remanding,
agreed that a verdict would not be set aside on the bare assumption that the defendant might have been prejudiced by adverse
publicity but it did declare that, where other errors intervene,
the misconduct in allowing the jurors to separate over defendant's protest would have weight on the issue of whether or not
to grant a new trial.
Questions concerning the sufficiency of the judgment and
sentence which follow upon a finding of guilty were posed in several cases for it would appear that the trial courts are still experiencing difficulty in making the judgment and sentence as
specific and as precise as possible. Much of the misunderstanding
seems to arise in connection with sentences imposed under the
1943 amendment to the Parole Act, 19 which amendment permits
the judge to fix minimum and maximum limits within those limits
provided by law for the offense. In People v. Rogers, 20 for example, the defendants had been indicted for burglary and, on a
plea of guilty, had been ordered confined until discharged by the
parole board, provided the term should not exceed the maximum,
nor be less than the minimum, provided by law for that offense.
The trial judge subsequently entered an order "recommending"
that the minimum duration of the sentence should be five years
and the maximum ten years. A reversal was ordered on the
ground that the defendant was entitled to have the judgment made
specific and certain so he might know the limits of its duration.21
18400 Ill. 603, 81 N. E. (2d) 445 (1948).
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 801 et seq.
20 401 Ill. 53, 81 N. E. (2d) 420 (1948).
21 See also People v. Crump, 402 Ill. 204, 83 N. E. (2d) 687 (1949), and People
v. Small, 401 Ill. 20, 81 N. E. (2d) 424 (1948).
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Wholesome contrast is provided, however, by the decision in
People v. Ashley, 22 wherein the defendant, adjudged guilty of
larceny of a motor vehicle, had been sentenced to a term of from
one to twenty years but which sentence also stated that the court,
after hearing evidence, had "fixed the minimum duration of imprisonment to be five years, and the maximum to be ten years."
The same contention was raised on appeal as had been argued
in the Rogers case, but the judgment was affirmed because the
court had "fixed" the sentence and had not merely "recommended" the same. The provision, by rule or statute, of a standardized judgment order might obviate much of the confusion.
Problems growing out of appellate procedure in criminal cases
still recur, but the case of People v. Kidd,23 one of first impression
in Illinois, dealt with the question as to whether or not a bill
of exceptions, signed nune pro tunc after the time for filing prescribed by Rule 70A 24 had run, could be deemed part of the record
on appeal. The defendants, after conviction, had been granted
a period of one hundred days within which to file a bill of exceptions. On the 98th day, the trial judge not being present, defendants presented the bill of exceptions to another judge of the district who ordered the same filed without signature. Three months
later, the bill was presented to the trial judge, who signed but
added the qualification that he was, at all times, within the jurisdiction and not ill or disabled. In answer to the state's contention
that the trial judge had lost jurisdiction on the expiration of the
one-hundredth day, defendants advanced the argument that the
order for filing constituted an extension of the period within which
the bill could be signed. The Supreme Court, construing the rule
in question, declared that the express provision therein requiring
a certificate of correctness by the trial judge before the bill is to be
filed precluded any other judge of the district from allowing the
bill to be filed without signature. Presentation to such other
judge, therefore, could not operate to prevent the running of time
22403 Il1. 395, 86 N. E. (2d) 212 (1949).
23401 Ill. 230, 81 N. E. (2d) 892 (1948). Gunn, J., agreed with the judgment but
disagreed over the construction of Rule 70A. He was of the opinion that the bill
of exceptions was properly before the court.
24 I1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.70A.
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for filing nor could a nunc pro tunc order supply the deficiency
in the record.
Claims concerning alleged infringement of the right to due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment have been made many
times and in a variety of ways, but no where is the difficulty of
obtaining review thereof more acute than where the defendant
seeks relief solely on the common-law record. Some clarification
may have been provided by the case of People v. LoftUs. 25 After
affirmance of his conviction for armed robbery by the state supreme court,26 the defendant there concerned applied for, and was
granted, certiorari by the United States Supreme Court. That
court made an announcement which amounted to an inquiry as to
the nature of the appropriate method to follow, under correct
Illinois procedure, on behalf of a defendant claiming a violation
of due process in the state court. 27 The Illinois Supreme Court
answered the interrogatory by enumerating the three methods
afforded by law 28 and by discussing the applicability thereof to
the case in chief. It declared that a writ of error was inappropriate as the matter complained of did not appear in the commonlaw record. For that matter, a petition or motion in the nature
of a writ of error coram nobis was inapplicable as that writ should
appropriately be addressed to the trial, not a reviewing, court.
By implication, therefore, the proper procedure seemed to call
for use of the writ of habeas corpus.
But if it be thought that the Loftus "announcement" served
as a clarifying agency, the decision in Young v. Ragen29 would
seem to indicate the converse is true for the state circuit court
there concerned had dismissed a similar petition for habeas corpus. When reversing that order, the federal supreme court remanded the case to permit a reconsideration in the light of the
earlier Illinois expression. It took the occasion to point out that
25 400 Ill. 432, 81 N. E. (2d) 495 (1948).
26 See People v. Loftus, 395 Ill. 479, 70 N. E. (2d) 573 (1947).
27 334 U. S. 804, 68 S. Ct. 1212, 92 L. Ed. 1737 (1948).
28 Those methods are (1)
by writ of error, based on the common law record,
which may be supplemented by a proper bill of exceptions; (2) by petition for writ
of habeas corpus, where the judgment of conviction is void; and (3) by motion
in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949,
Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 196.
29 337 U. S. 235, 69 S. Ct. 1073, 93 L. Ed. 1333 (1949).
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if the writ of habeas corpus was not available then there was
no post-trial remedy. Accepting the fact that there might be difficulty in adapting available state remedies to meet the requirement that prisoners be given some clearly defined method by which
to raise their claims, the court nevertheless insisted that the requirement be met.
The legislature appears to have come to the aid of the courts
by enacting a new statutory proceeding designed to cover the
point.3° It provides, in brief, that any imprisoned person who
asserts that there has been a substantial denial of constitutional
right, either federal or state, may institute a proceeding by petition in the court in which the conviction took place setting forth
the matters relied upon. The trial court is authorized to enter
such orders as may be appropriate, with opportunity for review
by the state supreme court on writ of error, if taken within six
months from the date of the judgment.
Application and construction of the Parole Act 3 ' became
necessary in two quite similar cases filed before the Illinois Supreme Court as original petitions for habeas corpusA 2 In each
instance the defendant had been "paroled" to another jurisdiction
so that he could be tried for an offense committed therein although,
in neither case, had there been even colorable compliance with the
requirement that the parolee should secure useful employment
and a home free from criminal influence. The relators virtually
conceded that the paroles were invalid but did claim that the time
spent in the foreign jurisdiction should be credited on the Illinois
sentence. The relators were remanded to the custody of the
warden when the court declared the acts of the parole board were
void and, being void, could create no right in favor of the re3
lators.
30 Laws 1949, p. 722, S. B. 630; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 38, § 826 et seq.

31 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 807.
32 People ex rel. Miller v. Nierstheimer, 402 Ill. 599, 85 N. E. (2d) 10 (1949),
and People ex rel. Milburn v. Nierstheimer, 401 Ill. 465, 82 N. E. (2d) 438 (1948).
33 Brief note may be made of the fact that the Probation Act has been amended
to allow wider latitude in probation matters to the nisi prius court: Laws 1949,
p. 719, H. B. 341; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 785. There have also been
some technical changes in the law relating to the sentence and parole of felons:
Laws 1949, pp. 727-8, S. B. 664 and 556; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, §§ 801
and 803.
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V. FAMILY LAW
Family law provides a never-ending series of interesting questions. True to norm, the greater portion of the problems presented during the current period concerned issues arising out of
divorce suits. Many of the resulting decisions were little more
than reiterations of familiar rules; others struck at bold steps
which had been taken by the trial courts; but some brought new
horizons into view.
Illustrative of the first group is the case of Gleiser v. Gleiser1
wherein a default decree, granting plaintiff a divorce as well as
the custody of a minor child, also provided for child support and
attorney's fees although personal service on the non-resident defendant was lacking. Shortly after entry of the decree, the defendant, upon special appearance and leave granted, filed his
petition seeking to vacate those portions of the decree calling
for support money and attorney's fees because of the want of
jurisdiction over his person. The petition was denied by the
trial court after a hearing had been had thereon. That order
was reversed, as might be expected, on direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, 2 because the court noted that it had "long
been the established rule of this State that a decree requiring
the payment of alimony, child support or attorney's fees is a
decree in personam."'3 Such provisions being void for lack of
personal jurisdiction, they may properly be vacated even though
more than thirty days may have passed since the entry of the
decree,4 and the petition to vacate does not, of itself, constitute
a general appearance. 5 The court was careful to point out, however, that the father's obligation to support his child had not
ceased, either by the decree or by reason of the present ruling,
provided jurisdiction to enforce the same could be obtained.
One viewing the holdings of Illinois courts, when dealing with
the effect which remarriage has upon lump-sum alimony provi1402

Ill. 343, 83 N. E. (2d) 693 (1949).
Direct appeal was proper, under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199, because the alleged denial of due process presented a constitutional issue.
3 402 Ill. 343 at 345, 83 N. E. (2d) 693 at 694.
4 Thayer v. Village of Downers Grove, 369 Ill. 354, 16 N. E. (2d) 717 (1938).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 144.
2

